The object of this paper is to investigate the impact of uncertainty in a dynamic j ob search model where the states of the economy follow a Markov chain and the cost of search does not only depend on the state but on the period. Especially, we explore whether or not increasing the uncertainty about the states of the economy, the wage distribution, the number of job offered at a time and other search environments is beneficial to the searcher.
that the expected duration of search is independent of the uncertainty on wage when wages are identically and independently normally distributed.
A Dynamic Job Search Model
Suppose that an individual, called the searcher, is seeking a j ob opportunity over discrete time periods n,n=1,2, ••• ,N. At the beginning of each period he is offered a job and then has to make a decision of whether he accepts the offer and stops searching or c.ontinues to search. He must also pay the cost of search at each period. On the other hand, the state of the economy changes according to a Markov chain. At each period the probability that the searcher receives an offer of the wage is independent of all past offers and of time, but depends on the state of last period. We use the following notations:
X n the cost of search at period n when the economy is in state i, the state transition probabilities, the wage of a job offered at period n, the probability distribution of Xn+1 when the economy is in We assume that no recall is allowed.
Definition. The following stopping rule is called a reservation wage policy: (1) Stop searching if Xn > Rn (i) Continue to search, otherwise.
Such values Rn(i) characterizing the above policy are called reservation wages.
A job offer, or simply a wage, should be interpreted as the discounted present value of the searcher's life time earnings from a job. Once he accepts a job offered, the search process terminates and he stays in the permanent position of employment. Let Vn(i,x) be the maximum value of the discounted expected return attainable from period n on when the economy is in state i and the current job offer is x at period n. It follows from the principle of optimality that Vn(i,x) satisfies the recursive equation It follows from (1) that an optimal policy is the reservation wage policy given by (1) . Note in this model that the reservation wage Rn(i) depends on i and the remaining periods (N-n) and hence the optimal policy is neither myopic nor one period look ahead.
Assumptions Proof: The proof is by induction on n. For n=N the statements (i) and
which is the sum of increasing functions of i. Rn(i) is increasing in i. exists and satisfies the recursive equation 
It is, therefore, interesting and important to pay some attention to the impact of uncertainty about probability distributions P i j ' F i (0) and en (i). It is obvious from theorem 1 that the better state of the economy the higher reservation wage, and the shorter the remaining periods the lower reservation wage.
How about the searcher's benefit if unce:rtainty increases? First of all, to investigate the effect of uncertainty about transition probabilities we write
E p~ . for all k and define
n n Proof: The proof is again by induc:tion on n. For n 1 hold with equalities. Assume for n + 1 that V n
Then, we have Secondly, we explore the effect of increasing uncertainty about wage
To this end we write where
For two distinct wage distributions F1, F2 such as Exl Theorem 4. OFi(y)dy for all x, we have
Proof: The proof is again by induction on n. For n = N theorem 4 holds with equalities. Since from theorem 1 V (i,x,F) is convex in x, it can be n shown (see [11] ) that the second degree of stochastic dominance implies (ii) 
Remarks: Theorem 5 simply states that it is favorable for the searcher to have exactly one offer at each period rather than a random number of offers with the mean of one at each period. Therefore, the searcher cannot take advantage of the possibility of receiving more than one offer at each period.
It is worthwhile to note that even if the cost of search were negligi.ble to the searcher, he would still have an incentive to searching because he has no perfect information about where his best job is located, and because he is is distributed with the mean IJ i and COTIID10n variance ( J . Then, equation (2) can be rewritten as follows:
At period N, r (i) = SLP . . IJ. since the searcher must accept whatever job is
offered at period N. Also, note that we use lower case letters for the case of no search cost.
Theorem 6. For all n rn(i)
and n but n = N. 
where the second equality follows from [4,p.333] . Putting a (i) = SEp . . a +1 U) n j ~J n and y (x-a n + 1
(j»/0, we obtain
A more interesting case is of that the wages are identically and independently normally distributed with the common mean ~ and variance 0 2 and that ~=1.
In this case, equation (7) reduces to as follows:
At period N rN
Then, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary. Assume that c (i) = 0 for all i, n and ~ = 1, and that a wage Assume for (n+l) that r n + 1 Remarks: Using 0 as a measure of uncertainty, the higher the uncertainty on the wage, the higher the reservation wage is set. Hence, we may be led to the conjecture that the expected number of search periods is increased by the increased uncertainty on the wage. However, this conjecture does not hold true, provided that jobs offer from a normally distributed sample space. Proof: Let IT be the probability of stopping the search at period n. n Under our reservation wage policy, IT is given by
Let ~ be the normal distribution with the mean 0 and variance 1. However, from Lemma above we know
which is independent of 0 as a measure of uncertainty. The expected number of search periods, denoted by N*, is
which is also independent of o.
(Q.E.D.)
Remarks: Note that the reservation wage does not depend on n for an infinite period model. So, put rn = r for all n = 1,2, . . . . Then, the expected number of search periods is as follows;
Therefore, an increased uncertainty on 1~ages has no effect on the expected duration of search.
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Some Concluding Remarks
In this paper we havE: extended the theory of job search to include the case of the dynamic nonstationary search environment. We proved under some specific conditions that (1) an optimal search strategy is no longer myopic but is characterized by a reservation wage, which depends on the state of the economy and on the remaining periods of searching, (2) the maximum return and the reservation wage both increase as the economy is improved and (3) increasing the riskiness of the wage offer distribution is beneficial to the searcher, but he cannot take advantage of the random number of job offers tendered per period. (4) We also give an explicite form to the reservation wage for the case of no search cost. Especially when wages are identically and independently normally distributed, such reservation wage has a positive linear form of the variance and the expected duration of search is independent of the variance as a measure of uncertainty on the wage. What the paper intended to do is explicitly to discuss the impact of increased uncertainty about the state transition probability, the wage offer distribution, the number of job offers per period and the cost of search. Future research should be encouraged to include the case of that the searcher may revise his wage offer distribution as he learns from the past experience of searching. A possible approach is to assume that past observations are emitted from some other probability distributions and the wage distribution is revised according to a Bayesian rule.
